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In the UltimatumGame, a proposer suggests how to split a sum ofmoney with a responder. If the responder
rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment
implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost.
However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of
antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation.
Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature ofUltimatumGame punishers by analyzing
their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations
is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial)
punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the
evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems.
A
wealth of interdisciplinary research has attested to the pivotal role of fairness norms in explaining
cooperation amongst unrelated individuals1–6. The Ultimatum Game (UG)7 has been one of the most
prolific set-ups for unraveling the nature of human fairness over the last years1,3,5,8–18. In this game, one
player (the proposer) proposes a way to split a sum of money with another player (the responder). If the
responder accepts the offer, both players are paid accordingly; if she rejects the offer, neither player is paid.
The rejection of positive, albeit low offers is considered to be an expression of costly punishment of unfair
behavior able to enforce the social norm of fairness2,3. Thus, the prevailing view is that individuals’ (prosocial)
preferences for fairness motivate the rejection of low offers in the UG. Such an argument has been used to support
the strong reciprocity model of the evolution of human cooperation4,19–21. However, recent evidence now chal-
lenges this interpretation22.
Indeed, less prosocial motivations may be behind UG rejections. Rejections are equally compatible with
competitive, spiteful motives23–26. A spiteful responder who is concerned with her own relative standing prefers
a zero-zero outcome over one that leaves her below the proposer. Thus, she will reject any offer below the equal
split, just like an individual concerned with the fairness norm. This implies that the mere observation of UG
behavior is insufficient to determine the motivation of rejections. A crucial factor that should not be overlooked
points directly to the punisher27,28: does she herself comply with the norm?
Recent research on cooperation games reveals that costly punishment is not only used by cooperators but also
by non-cooperators who punish (other) non-cooperators29, cooperators30,31 or both28. These punishment pat-
terns, which cannot be reconciled with fairnessmotives, have been traced back to competitive, spiteful individuals
aiming to increase their own relative payoff. Such findings are particularly important insofar as theoretical and
empirical evidence demonstrates that the commons can be destroyed by the presence of ‘‘spiteful (unfair)
punishers’’, which can ultimately turn a sanctioning institution into a detrimental force for public cooperation
(30–34; see35 for a recent overview).
This note investigates experimentally to what extent fair and unfair punishers coexist in theUG. To disentangle
‘‘prosocial’’ and ‘‘antisocial’’ types of punishment, this paper combines the rejection behavior of subjects in the
UG with their decisions as dictators in a Dictator Game (DG)36. The DG is identical to the UG except that the
second player is now passive, that is, she cannot reject the offer. As a result, generous offers by dictators are
genuinely prosocial. A prosocial individual concerned about fairness will split the pie equally in the DG and reject
unequal offers in the UG. A spite-driven, antisocial individual, however, will still reject unequal offers but transfer
nothing in the DG (hence being totally unfair) in order to achieve the highest payoff differential. Note that pure
selfishness also predicts a zero-transfer in the DG but never the rejection of any positive offers in the UG.
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Therefore, the rejection of unequal but positive offers combined with
zero-transfers in the DG is an unequivocal symptom of competitive
spite.
We report data from two large-scale experimental studies. Study 1
(n5 754) is a survey-experiment employing a representative sample
of a city’s adult population which was carried out at the participants’
households. The pie to be split was J20 in each game. For UG
responses, the strategy method was used in which the responder
states whether she accepts/rejects any possible offer beforehand.
Study 2 (n5 623) is a replication of Study 1 in the laboratory employ-
ing university students (freshmen) as subjects (see Methods).
Results
Figure 1 breaks down the sample into three groups according to
participants’ decisions in the DG: ‘‘unfair’’ refers to participants
who offer zero in the DG, ‘‘fair’’ refers to those who make an equal
split, while those who make an offer in between the two are labeled
‘‘remaining’’. For each group, the figure displays the percentage of
responders who reject offers below the equal split in the UG. Study 1
[2] is captured by the left [right] panel.
The data clearly demonstrate that it is not only the ‘‘fair’’ but also
the (totally) ‘‘unfair’’ dictators who reject unequal offers significantly
more often than the ‘‘remaining’’ group (Probitmodel controlling for
order effects in decisions; fair vs. remaining: p, 0.001 in Study 1 and
2; unfair vs. remaining: p5 0.005 in Study 1, p, 0.001 in Study 2; see
model 1 in Table S1 for Study 1 and Table S2 for Study 2 in the
Supplementary Information (SI)). What is more, both groups are
similarly likely to reject an unequal offer (p 5 0.123 in Study 1, p
5 0.356 in Study 2). As analyzed in more detail in the SI (see Figure
S3), there is a statistically significant U-shaped, non-linear relation-
ship between the two variables in both samples (all ps, 0.001) when
using the offers in the DG as a continuous explanatory variable
(rather than comparing between the three DG groups).
Furthermore, having decided first as dictator or as responder does
not affect the reported relationship (no significant main or inter-
action order effects are observed in any study: all ps . 0.16; see SI).
Thus, fair and unfair punishers coexist in the UG. In addition, in
both samples fair dictators are more numerous than unfair ones (see
the numbers on the top of the bars in Figure 1; the percentage of fair
dictators is significantly higher than the percentage of unfair dicta-
tors according to a two-tailed binomial test: p, 0.001 in both stud-
ies). This implies that fairness-based punishment is more frequent in
both samples – which, nevertheless, should not necessarily be the
case in samples taken from other populations/societies30 (also, as
discussed in the SI, methodological factors might influence these
proportions). Indeed, among the UG responders who reject unequal
offers in Study 1 [2], 17% [15%] are unfair dictators while 70% [72%]
are fair dictators (these percentages are also significantly different
according to a two-tailed binomial test: p , 0.001 in both studies).
Importantly, note that the relationship between DG offers and UG
rejections holds even in the presence of differences between the two
samples. In particular, in Study 1 the proportion of unfair dictators as
well as the likelihood of rejecting unequal UG offers is higher com-
pared to Study 2 (in both cases, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test yields p
, 0.001).
Discussion
The results show that punishment decisions in the UG are indistin-
guishably ‘‘prosocial’’ and ‘‘antisocial’’; it is not one or the other, but
both kinds of human behavior that shape the outcomes of the UG.
Such a finding has important implications in interpreting previous
results and designing future research.
One prominent example lies in the realm of behavioral and social
neuroscience, where data from rejections in the UG have been exten-
sively used to investigate the neurobiological basis of costly punish-
ment. This research has implicated the brain areas responsible both
for negative emotional processes (e.g., the anterior insula) and for
executive control (e.g., the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) in rejection
behavior. Yet, there is much debate on the exact role of executive
control. Some studies appear to indicate that executive control must
be exerted to override the emotional impulse to punish unfairness at
personal cost5,37 whereas others suggest that it is the selfish impulse to
accept an unfair offer which must be overridden in order to impose
fairness through rejection, thus implying that punishment is an act of
self-control8,38. Recently, more studies have shed light on these
apparently contradictory observations13–16 but the debate is far from
closed. The results presented in this note indicate that there is a non-
negligible fraction of rejections that are rooted not in normative,
fairness-based judgments but instead in competitive, spiteful desires.
It would in fact be hard to claim that a common neural mechanism
underlies these extremely different natures of rejection behavior.
Instead, one of the two might be overrepresented in some databases
– which might have been due to the small sample sizes typically
featured in brain studies – and, as suggested in29, this could explain
part of the above controversy. Note also that the proportion of pro-
social and antisocial punishers may vary dramatically across
societies30,35,39.
Thus, in order to unravel the neurobiological basis of costly pun-
ishment, researchers should carefully investigate not only which
behavior gets punished but also who is the punishing individual.
Figure 1 | Willingness to reject unequal offers by DG groups. Left [right] panel for Study 1 [2]. The horizontal axis depicts behavior in the DG:
unfair (offer 0%), remaining (offer between 0 and 50%), fair (offer 50%). The numbers on top of the bars denote the total number of observations in each
group. The vertical axis represents the percentage of individuals (6 SE)who reject offers below 50% in theUG, i.e. whoseminimum acceptable offer is the
equal split (mean percentage: 45.49% in Study 1, 18.78% in Study 2). * p 5 0.005, ** p , 0.001.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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However, this cannot be addressed using the standard UG as the only
information researchers obtain from responders is whether they
accept or reject a given proposal (or a number of them). Other
experimental settings, or the combination of UG rejections with
subjects’ behavior in other frameworks, should be employed.
Additionally, the results are also important from the viewpoint of
evolutionary biology and the social sciences. Costly punishment has
been shown to be crucial in promoting cooperation40–43. Never-
theless, in the presence of spiteful punishers, social efficiency
becomes difficult to sustain since spiteful behavior often leads to
escalating conflict rather than to lasting cooperation. When sanc-
tions are not used as norm-enforcement devices but instead at the
service of dominance- or conflict-seeking behavior, their effects over
social stability can be perverse30–32,44. If the punisher lacks the legit-
imacy to teach amoral lesson – because she does not comply with the
social norm herself – the punished individual can view punishment
as unjustified coercion. Thismight activate themechanisms involved
in competition with conspecifics instead of those involved in norm
compliance, thus paving the way to inefficient, corrupt societies45,46
rather than to efficient, cooperative ones47. In fact, corruption among
the responsible for the enforcement of rules is recognized as a major
source for the failure of social institutions48.
Therefore, special care has to be taken in the interpretation of
rejection behavior as a mechanism to enforce the norms implicated
in the maintenance of stable social systems. Extending the argument
to the field of institutional design, failing to recognize the possible
duality of motives behind punishment behavior in bilateral bargain-
ing interactions can lead to less-than-optimal, or even counter-
effective incentive mechanisms.
Methods
The details of the survey-experiment have been reported elsewhere49. In both studies,
subjects made their decisions in the UG (both roles) and the DG in random order.
Subjects’ decisions as proposers in the UG are not being used here as a measure of
fairness since generous offers might equally be motivated by strategic self-interest
(avoidance of rejection) and by other-regarding concerns, thus making them difficult
to interpret50 (indeed, zero offers in the UG are extremely rare). In contrast, the
interpretation of subjects’ offers in the DG is straightforward because they are not
influenced by strategic concerns.
In the DG, subjects had to split a pie of J20 between themselves and another
anonymous participant. Subjects decided which share of theJ20 (inJ2 increments)
they wanted to transfer to the other subject. For the role of responder in the UG the
strategymethod was used51. That is, subjects had to state their willingness to accept or
reject each of the following proposals (proposer’s payoff [J], responder’s payoff [J]):
(20, 0); (18, 2); (16, 4); (14, 6); (12, 8); (10, 10). After making their decisions, parti-
cipants in each study were randomly matched and one of every ten was selected for
real payment (see Supplementary Information).
For the statistical analyses, we use Probit regressions with the likelihood that a
subject rejects any unequal offer (i.e. whether her minimum acceptable offer is the
equal split) in the UG as the dependent variable and DG behavior as the explanatory
variable. Using the same database, a similar approach was employed in Staffiero
et al.52 for the study of the motivational drives behind the acceptance of zero offers in
the UG.
All participants in the experiments reported in the manuscript were informed
about the content of the experiment prior to participating. Verbal informed consent
was obtained from participants in the city experiment (Study 1) since literacy was not
a requirement to participate (this was necessary to obtain a representative sample),
and all the instructions were read aloud by the interviewers. Written informed con-
sent was obtained from participants in the lab experiment (Study 2). Anonymity was
always preserved (in agreement with Spanish Law 15/1999 on Personal Data
Protection) by randomly assigning a numerical code to identify the participants in the
system. No association was ever made between their real names/addresses and the
results. As is standard in socio-economic experiments, no ethic concerns are involved
other than preserving the anonymity of participants. This procedure was checked and
approved by the Vice-dean of Research of the School of Economics of the University
of Granada; the institution hosting the experiments.
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